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Forced disappearances may violate numerous provisions ofinternational human rights instruments, including theAmerican Convention on Human Rights (American Con-
vention) and the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Con-
vention). The relevant provisions include the right to liberty, the
right to be free from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
and the right to life. A forced disappearance is a violation of the
victim’s right to liberty. It is not as clear, however, when the
right to life or the right to be free from torture, inhuman, or
degrading treatment is violated. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, the following elements constitute a forced disappearance:
“a) a deprivation of liberty; b) by government agents or with their
consent or acquiescence; followed by (c) an absence of infor-
mation or refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person;
(d) thereby placing such persons outside the protection of the
law.” This definition is reflected within the jurisprudence of
both the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). 
Unlike the IACHR, which has been adjudicating claims of
forced disappearances for over 15 years, the ECHR has only
recently addressed this issue, largely in response to increased alle-
gations of forced disappearances by victims’ families against
Turkey. Although the ECHR has looked to the IACHR in devel-
oping much of its nascent forced disappearance jurisprudence,
its jurisprudence on the subject has not been wholly consistent.
A comparison of the jurisprudence of the ECHR with that of the
IACHR must explore three legal issues common to all forced dis-
appearances. These issues include the legal value of finding a pat-
tern or practice of forced disappearances; the necessary eviden-
tiary burden to establish a violation of the right to life; and the
requisite burden of proof to establish a violation of the right to
be free from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Presently,
the ECHR’s jurisprudence is not as responsive to the nature of
forced disappearances as that of the IACHR with regard to the
issues of establishing a pattern or practice of forced disappear-
ances and the evidentiary burden of proof required to prove a
violation of the right to be free from torture, degrading, or inhu-
man treatment. Regarding the burden of proof required to
prove a violation of the right to life, however, the ECHR’s
jurisprudence is more aligned with that of the IACHR and is
more responsive to the nature of forced disappearances. 
The Establishment of a Pattern or Practice of Forced
Disappearances
Finding a pattern or practice of forced disappearances is the
bedrock of the IACHR’s jurisprudence on this issue and steers
the rest of the analysis, including the standards of proof for find-
ing a violation of the right to life and the right to be free from
torture. This is best illustrated by the IACHR’s seminal forced
disappearance case, Caso Velásquez Rodríguez, which arose out of
events in Honduras from 1981-1984. In Velásquez Rodríguez, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights presented evi-
dence to the IACHR on behalf of the applicant (the victim’s
father), suggesting the Honduran government conducted, or
at least tolerated, a pattern or practice of forced disappear-
ance. Such evidence included testimony from victims of arbitrary
detentions during the relevant period, interviews with family
members whose relatives were disappeared, and general coun-
try reports produced by independent, non-governmental orga-
nizations. From this evidence, the IACHR concluded a pattern
or practice of forced disappearance existed in Honduras.
After concluding a pattern or practice existed and was “sup-
ported or tolerated” by the government, the IACHR stated that
if the applicant could link the disappearance of a particular indi-
vidual to that practice, then the “disappearance of [a] particu-
lar individual [could] be proved through circumstantial or
indirect evidence or by logical inference.” The value of the
IACHR’s holding is significant because it lowers the burden of
proof for an individual to establish that a forced disappear-
ance occurred. This lowering of the evidentiary burden increases
the likelihood of success on the merits.
The ECHR has similarly considered that a pattern or practice
of forced disappearances is a cognizable legal issue. Unlike the
IACHR, however, the ECHR has yet to find a State Party respon-
sible for a pattern or practice of forced disappearances. This
issue arises almost exclusively with the ECHR’s treatment of
claims brought before the court by Kurds, and was most evident
in the 1998 case of Kurt v. Turkey. In Kurt, the applicant (the vic-
tim’s father) introduced reports produced by the UN Working
Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, including
a 1994 report indicating Turkey had the highest number of
alleged forced disappearance cases of any country in the world.
Strikingly, even with such credible evidence, in paragraph 169 of
its opinion, the ECHR concluded the report did not establish a
pattern or practice of forced disappearances. 
The ECHR’s handling of this question was inadequate in two
ways. First, the ECHR’s analysis of the evidence presented was
cursory. Only two paragraphs, 168 and 169, were dedicated to
determining whether a pattern or practice of forced disap-
pearances existed, and the decision did not address why the 1994
UN report was insufficiently suggestive or reliable. Second, the
ECHR did not give any guidance as to what evidence would be
necessary to establish a pattern or practice. Rather, the court sim-
ply stated the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish
a practice or pattern. 
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Memorial Wall to the Disappeared in Santiago, Chile.
The Requisite Burden of Proof for a
Violation of the Right to Life
Based on the IACHR’s finding of a pattern or practice pre-
sumption, as indicated above, the evidentiary burden to establish
a violation of the right to life is less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, though the IACHR has not articulated a particular stan-
dard for this lesser burden. Most forced disappearance cases, how-
ever, arise in the context of a pattern or practice. 
In Velásquez Rodríguez, the IACHR addressed the burden of
proof required in forced disappearance cases where a pattern
or practice was established. The discussion focused on the fact
that in cases of forced disappearances, the government involved
likely would “attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim.” The gov-
ernment’s concealment or destruction of direct evidence,
namely a body, renders it virtually impossible to prove a viola-
tion of the right to life. Thus, recognizing that direct evidence
would almost always be unavailable to establish a violation of the
right to life, the IACHR permitted a finding of violation of the
right to life based exclusively on circumstantial evidence, or even
logical inference. 
In Velásquez Rodríguez, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evi-
dence, including hearsay testimony by the victim’s sister, who
testified that eyewitnesses saw Man-
fredo Velásquez kidnapped by men
in civilian clothes in broad daylight.
The IACHR acknowledged that
when the Honduran government
carried out or tolerated forced dis-
appearances, the police customarily
use this form of kidnapping. Conse-
quently, the Court presumed
Velásquez disappeared at the “hands
of or with the acquiescence of those
officials with the framework of that
practice.” Moreover, the fact that the government failed to
investigate or make any inquiry into his disappearance, and
thwarted attempts by the victim’s family to do so, strongly sug-
gested the government’s involvement in the disappearance,
even if there was no direct evidence indicating the government
kidnapped Velásquez. Finally, because Velásquez had not been
seen for over seven years, the IACHR reasonably concluded that
Velásquez could be presumed dead. Although the IACHR did
not name the evidentiary burden for establishing a violation of
the right to life, proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not
required as indicated by the IACHR’s use of circumstantial or
indirect evidence, as well as logical inferences, to hold Honduras
in violation of the victim’s right to life. 
Until 2000, the ECHR required an applicant to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the victim had died before the court
would find a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the
European Convention. In 2000, however, the ECHR decided
Timurtas v. Turkey, which altered the jurisprudence of the court
by permitting a lesser evidentiary burden in cases of forced
disappearances. The ECHR dismissed the need for direct evi-
dence previously held necessary in Kurt, and instead permitted
the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a violation of the
right to life, stating that “whether the failure on the part of
authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainee’s
fate, in the absence of a body, might raise issues under Article 2
of the Convention will depend on the circumstances of the
case, and in particular on the existence of sufficient circum-
stantial evidence, based on concrete elements, from which it may
be concluded to the requisite standard of proof that the detainee
must be presumed to have died in custody.” Although the
ECHR never explicitly stated that it rejects the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard for an Article 2 violation, unlike in
Kurt, it never mentioned the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard in Timurtas. Moreover, its willingness to rely exclusively on
circumstantial evidence also signals a departure from Kurt and
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
This new approach by the ECHR was affirmed on February
27, 2001, in Çiçik v. Turkey. In Çiçik, the ECHR held that cir-
cumstantial evidence would suffice for finding a right to life vio-
lation. The question for litigators that arises from Timurtas and
Çiçik involves a determination of what is required under the new
evidentiary burden to find a violation of the right to life. Timur-
tas sheds some light on what is required of an applicant to find
a violation of the right to life based on circumstantial evidence.
In Timurtas, the victim’s father brought a claim against
Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention,
including the right to life (Article 2) and the right to liberty and
security of person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on
August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap
Timurtas. At the time the petition was filed in southeast Turkey
nearly six and one-half half years later, Timurtas was still miss-
ing. According to the applicant, gendarmes first detained Timur-
tas and then transferred him to another detainment facility.
Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension
or subsequent detainment, the
applicant presented evidence cor-
roborating his version of events,
including a photocopy of a post-
operation report signed by the com-
mander of gendarmes operations in
Silopi, Turkey. The report was dated
August 14, 1993, marked with a ref-
erence number, and catalogued the
series of events that transpired on
that day. These events included a
description of Timurtas’ arrest and
the results of a subsequent interrogation that occurred while
Timurtas was in detention. Timurtas’ interrogators accused
him of being a leader of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in
the Silopi region. 
Based on the above facts, the ECHR concluded the circum-
stantial evidence was sufficient to find that Turkey violated the
victim’s right to life. In reaching its determination, the ECHR
distinguished Kurt by indicating three specific facts that were pre-
sent in Timurtas, and not in Kurt, which facilitated a finding of
a violation of the right to life in light of the general context of
the political situation in southeast Turkey. First, in Timurtas, there
was credible evidence that the victim was taken to a detainment
facility. It is not enough, as in Kurt, that the victim was last
seen surrounded by soldiers, even if he was seen leaving with
them. Evidence that the victim was taken to a detainment facil-
ity is required. Second, there must be reliable evidence indicating
why the authorities would want to detain the victim. In Timur-
tas, it was established that the authorities believed the victim was
affiliated with the PKK, thus demonstrating the Turkish author-
ities had reason to kidnap the victim. In Kurt, there was only min-
imal evidence in the record indicating the Turkish authorities
had a motive in detaining the victim. Third, enough time must
have lapsed since the disappearance for the victim to be pre-
sumed dead. In Timurtas, six and one-half years had passed
since the victim was last seen, while in Kurt only four and one-
half years had passed. 
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The effect of the Timurtas decision is that if circumstantial
evidence exists establishing these three facts, the ECHR would
be willing to hold a State Party in violation of the right to life.
The ECHR used these three facts subsequently in Çiçik to hold
that Turkey once again violated the victim’s right to life.
Consequently, although Timurtas and Çiçik lowered the evi-
dentiary burden to prove a right to life violation, it is still
unclear to what degree this burden has dropped. Because the
ECHR appears to require the three Timurtas factors, the burden
of proof is still very high and is not an adequate response to the
crime of forced disappearances. This largely is because of the
difficulty complainants face in establishing the first of these fac-
tors—credible evidence that the victim not only was appre-
hended, but also was taken to a detainment facility. In Timur-
tas, the victim’s father was very fortunate to discover the report
indicating Timurtas was not only taken to a detainment facility,
but also detained. In most cases, however, it is highly unlikely
that the person bringing a claim would be able to find such a
report, because in forced disappearance cases the perpetra-
tors likely will attempt to destroy or conceal evidence of the
crime. Therefore, requiring a party to produce such an item, or
similar evidence, to find a violation of the right of life would,
in reality, be comparable to keeping the evidentiary burden near
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an approach by the
Court would reward perpetrators for destroying evidence that
could be used in finding a right to life violation.
The Right to be Free from Torture, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment
The reasoning the IACHR employed in Velásquez Rodríguez
on the issue of the evidentiary burden required to prove a vio-
lation of the right to life in forced disappearance cases is directly
applicable to claims of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment under Article 5 of the American Convention. An
applicant can establish the victim suffered torture based on
“circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference.”
In contrast, although the ECHR has removed its beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard for violations of the right to life, it has
not discharged this burden for an applicant who attempts to hold
a State accountable for violating the right to be free from tor-
ture under Article 3 of the European Convention. In Çiçik, the
ECHR squarely addressed the issue of the evidentiary burden
required to establish a claim of torture. The Court stated that
the standard of proof for finding the victim suffered torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment was not established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the applicant did not
introduce any “direct evidence that her sons were indeed the
victims of ill-treatment,” the Court found that the applicant did
not meet the requisite evidentiary burden. 
The ECHR’s employment of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to establish a claim of torture raises numerous concerns
in light of the objectives of international human rights law,
especially the applicability of such law in the context of forced
disappearances. There are two concerns that warrant atten-
tion. First, in forced disappearance cases, as stated by the
IACHR in Velásquez Rodríguez, the government likely will attempt
to conceal or destroy the pertinent evidence. Consequently, any
direct evidence of the victim’s fate will be sparse, thus render-
ing it virtually impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the authorities tortured the victim. 
Second, as the IACHR emphasized in Velásquez Rodríguez,
“international protection of human rights should not be con-
fused with criminal justice.” An international human rights
proceeding is civil rather than criminal in nature. The objective
of international human rights law, as noted by Velásquez Rodríguez,
is not “to punish those individuals who are guilty of violations,
but rather to protect the victims and to provide for reparation
of damages resulting from the acts of the States responsible.”
These objectives are identical to those in any civil proceeding.
Therefore, the evidentiary burden required in most civil claims—
proof by a preponderance of the evidence—should be utilized
in human rights courts. Ironically, the ECHR’s use of the rea-
sonable doubt standard for torture claims has the effect of
encouraging perpetrators to destroy evidence of torture. By
eliminating the direct evidence, a State could shield itself from
liability before the ECHR.
Conclusion
At present, the ECHR’s forced disappearance jurisprudence
is not as well developed as the jurisprudence of the IACHR. The
ECHR analysis of the issue of a pattern or practice in Kurt sug-
gests that it is unwilling to find a pattern or practice of forced
disappearances even if evidence presented suggests that one
exists. Moreover, the ECHR’s use of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as the necessary evidentiary burden the applicant must
overcome to prove a violation of the right to be free from tor-
ture is inappropriate and counters the civil nature of human
rights proceedings. As stated by the IACHR in Velásquez Rodríguez,
“States do not appear before the Court as defendants in a crim-
inal action.” The goal of the adjudication is to compensate the
aggrieved party and not to punish the individual, thereby elim-
inating the need to use the evidentiary burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. There are, however, some positive signals
for the ECHR’s future adjudication of these issues based on its
recent decisions in Timurtas and Çiçik. The ECHR has moved
away from requiring the proof beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard to establish a violation of the right to life. It need now only
lower the evidentiary burden for torture claims, and be more
willing to recognize the existence of a pattern or practice of
forced disappearances when one exists. 
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